Engineering requires several years of experience to master the elements of the field sufficiently for the purpose of forensics, especially since most claims are multidisciplinary in content. For example, a building design involves the client, lawyers, accountants, architects, interior designers, quantity surveyors, mechanical and electrical engineers, electronic/ IT engineers, civil and structural engineers and often dozens of general and specialist contractors in these areas. In short, hundreds of interacting people, each of whom has a different perspective and expectation from the project. Thus, many people influence the design and construction process.

Very few engineering related claims actually go to court (perhaps less than 10%) as they are usually settled by negotiation between the parties. Many claims are about changes or contract variations (i.e., money and lots of it!) so that financial pressures lead to compromises (i.e., cutting of losses). The remainder of the claims are about minor defects in design or construction, with a small segment relating to major defects and even failures such as bridge collapses, vehicle breakdowns or crashes.

It is worth observing that accident rates have reduced dramatically in vehicles such as aircraft and automobiles. This is due to recent design improvements such as those due to increased metal fatigue life or passive/ active safety systems (ABS, airbags, etc). Most accidents are now attributable to "human error." Humans can contribute to accidents in other ways by, for example, deliberately cutting down on in-service inspection and maintenance costs. Also, as engineering activity is rather complicated in terms of technology and planning, many things can go wrong in the design and manufacturing phases. At best, such claims are about poor communication between the many organizations involved, and at worst due to a lack of understanding. This is rarely deliberate. People sometimes accept responsibility in pure ignorance of what is required. They may not even be aware that aspects of the project fall outside their experience. The complex background of many projects is such a potent recipe for problems that most fabrication/ construction contracts have standard clauses dedicated to contract variations and dispute resolution procedures.

This then is briefly the imperfect context within which forensic engineers operate. It can, of course, get worse. One of the areas I specialize in is Counter-Terrorist Measures (CTM), a topic which is not covered by conventional building regulations and standards. The datum against which decisions are made does not formally exist. For a start, what is "adequate" protection? Is it the worst bomb used so far by terrorists? How close to the building can these devices get? What about future methods of attack? As an example, in "conventional" designs against hurricanes, the regulations stipulate wind speeds based on historical statistics, geography and topography. Since there are no similar standards for CTM, these questions require judgment by the designer, the client and the forensic engineer.

There is some guidance available from government agencies and in the literature, but this is mainly qualitative and non-prescriptive. Ideally, a systematic, credible Threat and Risk Analysis is conducted. This is followed by a Cost-Benefit Analysis which allows for decisions to be made regarding the type and level of protection measures (both active and passive) to be used. Those in other fields such as defense, aerospace, nuclear power and oil, are quite familiar with these techniques. Indeed, the techniques were developed by these industries and their use is, for the most part, required by law. The fact that these methods exist and that protection measures are already available should lead to the assumption that they are being used regularly in design and construction. As previously noted, this is not the case.

Indeed, in some countries health and safety legislation has been interpreted by government lawyers to include the need for CTM under "Duty of Care" clauses conferred on corporate officers. This has yet to be tested in the courts, but it is perhaps only a matter of time.

Counter-Terrorist Measures are about protecting people, property and business activity. However, because CTM are not mandatory, many organizations treat them like buying insurance. The notion, "It will never happen to us" seems to predominate. History proves that the majority of corporations around the world whose business operations were disrupted by bombs, have gone out of business shortly thereafter. Lessons are being learned, albeit slowly.

It is hoped that by increasing public awareness through the media and forensic evidence of the threat posed by terrorist activities, improvements will be made in the design and regulation of buildings. This has already happened for buildings in earthquake areas, automobiles and aircraft. Cynics might argue that "adequate" safety is the minimum society will tolerate. I think we can do a lot better than that. It is a matter of initiative by individual forensic and design engineers to educate. We will do well to remember that two and a quarter millennia ago Archimedes told us that a large enough lever can move the world. I like to think that this came after he said "Eureka!"

Copyright © 1999 Young Forensic Scientists Forum / American Academy of Forensic Sciences