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To cite this article: Jose Pablo Baraybar , Valerie Brasey & Andrew Zadel (2007) The Need for a Centralised and Humanitarian-based Approach to Missing Persons in Iraq: An Example from Kosovo , The International Journal of Human Rights, 11:3, 265-274, DOI: [10.1080/13642980701443335](https://doi.org/10.1080/13642980701443335)

To link to this article: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13642980701443335>



Published online: 31 Jul 2007.



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The Need for a Centralised and Humanitarian-based Approach to Missing Persons in Iraq: An Example from Kosovo¹

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ABSTRACT *Forensics operations in Kosovo in 1999 lacked standard operating procedures (SOPs) and focused on volume of evidence rather than the identification of bodies. The results were chaotic and complicated later efforts to locate the missing. The establishment of the Office on Missing Persons and Forensics in 2002 prioritised the needs of the families of the missing, specifically the individual identification and return of human remains. Similarly, the search for missing persons in Iraq should be coordinated by a central body with the authority to enforce SOPs. Its aims should be to serve the needs of the families and to develop the capacity of Iraqis to carry out forensic work.*

Introduction: Lessons Learned

An estimated 290,000 persons are missing in Iraq due to the practice of forced disappearances, carried out by the Saddam Hussein regime over a number of decades.² As daunting as the figure may seem, it is not an unprecedented challenge: in Guatemala, some 200,000 persons died and 29,000 persons went missing over a thirty-year period.³ Their search for the missing has lasted over 12 years and the solution in Iraq must equally be approached as a long-term effort. As we will see with the Kosovo example, a narrow focus on forensic results, without proper coordination or a broader humanitarian mandate, could enflame tensions among the local population and create its own humanitarian crisis.

The application of forensic sciences to the prosecution of serious violations of international humanitarian law is a recent development.⁴ For some time however, these disciplines have been successfully applied in the context of truth commissions and independent inquiries.⁵ Originally, due to the specific mandate of those sponsoring the investigations (government commissions, family associations, etc.), the use of forensic sciences was *ad hoc* and its primary goal was accurate human rights reporting. However, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) and the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) have since set a precedent for the systematic application

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of forensic sciences on a larger scale and their use in human rights enforcement. Since legal prosecution is the principal aim of these tribunals, their approach to missing persons has tended towards 'categorical identification' in order to prove that victims belonged to a certain ethnic or religious group.⁶

More recently in the Balkans, a process has been developed that focuses on 'individual identification' and providing answers to the families of the missing. This shift recognises that the emotional needs of those who have lost loved ones must take precedence over the application of judicial mechanisms. The enforcement of humanitarian law must be understood as one aspect of a larger project: healing the psychological wounds resulting from a conflict and restabilising the society it imbalanced. This more empathetic strategy is based on the efforts of two organisations: the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the International Commission for Missing Persons (ICMP). The former has concentrated on tracing requests for information about individual missing persons, whereas the latter has promoted the use of DNA testing to identify mortal remains. The United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) Office on Missing Persons and Forensics (OMPF) accommodates both these processes, as well as managing its own investigations into the whereabouts of the missing. OMPF is mandated to determine the whereabouts of persons missing from the Kosovo conflict through mechanisms including forensics and community outreach activities.

The latter half of this paper outlines both the structure of OMPF operations and the normal course of a positive identification as a working model for dealing with the issue of the missing in Iraq. This model is applicable insofar as the Iraqi situation mirrors that of the Balkans: in both cases it is fair to conclude that the majority of the missing are dead, considering the time elapsed since the disappearances and evidence attesting to mass killings.⁷ While the situation in Iraq must be treated from within a forensics framework, any approach must be tailored to the needs of the people in that country. The discussion in the following section draws on our experience in applying forensic sciences to both criminal prosecutions and human rights advocacy, in the Balkans, Africa, and Latin America. Furthermore, our recommendations are in conformance with the principles expressed in the ICRC document, *The Missing: The Right to Know*.⁸

Herein, we advocate a humanitarian-based approach to dealing with missing person issues. As seen in the Kosovo example, forensics and criminal investigations cannot alone resolve post-conflict issues in any lasting or meaningful way. Furthermore, the effective use of forensic science is contingent on standardisation, coordination, and the responsible management of the data it produces. This paper offers several recommendations for dealing with the issue of the missing in Iraq based on lessons learned in the field. These same suggestions were presented by Jose Pablo Baraybar to the Special Representative of the UN Secretary General in Baghdad, in June 2003. They have also been presented during a series of consultative meetings in 2005 and 2006 with the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq and the Iraqi Ministry of Human Rights. The National Centre for Missing and Disappeared Persons in Iraq was established in September 2005. These recommendations can be summarised as follows:

Strategic Recommendations

- The search for the missing should be led by an autonomous and centralised organisation with a clear mandate. The organisation should be responsible for enforcing standard

operating procedures (SOPs) common to all groups involved, enabling findings to be used for criminal prosecutions. A thorough assessment of relevant information should be carried out before creating this body.

- This central organisation should adopt a broad humanitarian-based mandate, combining forensics with community outreach activities and data management. Any forensic work should be conducted with the primary aim of identifying victims and returning their remains to their families. Legal issues stemming from the search of the missing (death certificates, compensation, etc.) should be considered as early as possible.
- The organisation should be designed primarily as a service-provider for the families of the missing, with a focus on transparency and accountability. It should volunteer as much information as possible, allow participation from the families, and welcome their scrutiny. Its structure should not be imposed, but rather designed in consultation with Iraqi civil society (family groups, human rights organisations, etc.).
- Developing the capacity of Iraqis to carry out this work should be a principal aim of this organisation. It should draw on local resources where possible, but impose external work standards. Any implementation of systems or technology should be sustainable, user-friendly, and adapted to the needs of the country.
- Before undertaking any forensic work, the ‘universe of the missing’ must be defined as far as possible: the number of persons unaccounted for, their names, contact information for next of kin, and when and where the disappearances took place. Where possible, documentation should be provided to affirm the prior existence of the person and at least two individuals should provide separate information. In Iraq, several organisations have already begun to gather systematic information.⁹

Tactical Recommendations

- The central organisation for the issue of the missing should work closely with the judiciary and other governmental and non-governmental groups, employing a strong coordinating mechanism.
- The organisation should also maintain strong links with human rights organisations, family associations, and other associations of victims, with a focus on information sharing.
- Such an organisation should be composed of Iraqis, as far as possible, with international experts acting in an instructive and not merely consultative capacity. The United Nations should provide its standing expertise to support this process.
- The adopted protocols should be locally sustainable; no protocol dependent upon overly sophisticated technology or extremely specialised personnel should be adopted.
- The establishment of SOPs should be based on a wide consultation including the UN and the ICRC. Experienced parties within the UN system should assist the project.
- The Iraqi administration should publicly recognise that the resolution of the issue of missing persons in Iraq will take a long time and may never be fully completed.

Forensics and Human Rights, from Africa to the Balkans

In 1995, the ICTR approached Physicians for Human Rights (PHR) to establish a programme to collect forensic evidence.¹⁰ With funding from the US Government and

staff support from PHR, ICTR conducted exhumations of mass graves and post-mortem examinations. Their new scientific support unit only had the opportunity to examine two significant sites: the church in Kibuye (western Rwanda) and the Amgar Garage in Kigali, to be used in the Kayishema and Rutaganda trials, respectively.¹¹ Given the scale of the genocide, the Office of the Prosecutor remained unsure whether further forensic evidence should be gathered. Victims' families soon took it upon themselves to exhume bodies, store them in warehouses, and ultimately transfer them to memorial graveyards.

While it would have been impractical to collect detailed forensic information for a nationwide genocide, ICTR could have greatly benefited from evidence regarding the *modus operandi* of different groups of perpetrators. Though scene of crime information and some other forensic data were collected on a case-by-case scale, the bulk of that evidence was irrecoverable by the middle of 1996. More importantly in Rwanda, there has been no effort to deal with the issue of the missing. The scope of the conflict has perhaps proved overwhelming, as no organisation has committed to investigating the whereabouts of hundreds of thousands of persons.¹²

By the spring of 1996, the ICTY decided to strengthen its prosecution of war crimes in Srebrenica (eastern Bosnia) and Vukovar (eastern Slavonia, Croatia) by collecting forensic evidence.¹³ ICTY intended to gather all of this evidence in one summer, borrowing the ICTR's scientific support unit for a three-month period. In the latter half of 1996, four major sites were exhumed. Based on the successes of the ICTR team, ICTY launched an internally staffed forensic programme, exhuming a large number of sites in Bosnia between 1997 and 2002. Many international and local NGOs took up the issue of the missing, with varying degrees of success.¹⁴

By the time ICTY launched investigations in Kosovo, there was a strong precedent for collecting forensic evidence to prosecute large-scale breaches of humanitarian law. However, due to enthusiastic media attention towards the Tribunal and its investigations, many forensics groups showed an interest in Kosovo. Sadly, forensic operations there in 1999 provide a key example of the problems created by inadequate planning and a lack of centralisation. ICTY received multiple recommendations about defining SOPs and prescribing the scope of its forensic operation prior to its commencement.¹⁵ Disregarding this advice, it immediately deployed all available forensic teams, regardless of experience or suitability, without issuing them clear guidelines.

The consequences in Kosovo were chaotic. No systematic exhumation records were tabulated and the quality of post-mortem examinations and identifications varied considerably between national teams. The impact of these issues has been tremendous: OMPF still lacks information on over 2,000 bodies, and has begun the necessary process of re-exhuming these remains, re-examining them, and sampling them for DNA testing.¹⁶ It is clear that ICTY narrowed its focus to offences committed by the Milosevic regime, rather than investigating all crimes committed during the conflict. Not only did this concentration leave aside broader humanitarian issues, it prioritised crimes against Kosovo Albanians over those committed against non-Albanian Kosovans. A large number of disappearances of Kosovo Serbs occurred both during the conflict and after the arrival of the NATO troops in 1999.

During the year 2000, ICTY heeded earlier advice and launched a large-scale, centralised forensic operation using clear SOPs. The Kosovo-wide operation was centralised at a mortuary in Orahovac (western Kosovo) where all mortal remains were examined,

identified, and returned to the victims' families. As in the previous year, ICTY accepted 'gratis' forensic teams from various countries, but instead had them operate under a unified command structure. This centralised operation produced reliable and well-documented forensic evidence. The importance of command and coordination is highlighted by problems with evidence from the British Forensic Team, which worked independently in Pristina (the multinational brigade sector under UK control).

ICTY's emphasis in Kosovo was primarily on 'numbers' and sought to demonstrate that crimes were systematic and widespread. Thus, the strategy was to perform autopsies on as many bodies as possible and rely on single testimonies or circumstantial evidence about criminal acts. ICTY reports that it exhumed 4,019 exhumed bodies in 1999 and 2000, and ongoing research shows that this number may be higher.¹⁷ Though discrepancies with the forensic data are notable, the lack of a serious effort towards humanitarian issues is even more egregious. Less than half of these bodies were identified, and most of the non-identified bodies exhumed in 1999 by gratis teams were reburied in locations still unknown to the Tribunal.

By not prioritising the identification of the examined victims, a serious humanitarian problem was created in Kosovo. Many families have been denied information about their loved ones, not because it is unascertainable, but because investigations have been handled improperly. The crime of genocide is, by definition, systematic and widespread, and its investigation similarly requires a broad strategy. However, any such broad strategy should encompass genocide both as a crime and as a humanitarian issue.

The Office on Missing Persons and Forensics

After ICTY ceased large-scale forensic operations at the end of 2000, the UN continued small-scale investigations without any central planning. As a consequence, a large amount of unstructured information was collected. Combined with the disorganised legacy of previous forensic teams working in Kosovo, a new strategy was needed to coordinate known information on the issue of the missing.

In June 2002, the UNMIK created the OMPF within the Department of Justice, in order to determine the whereabouts of persons who have been declared missing as a result of the conflict. OMPF was assigned the equally important responsibility of establishing a Medical Examiners' Office, providing medico-legal forensic examinations meeting international standards, and to develop the capacity of local staff to maintain these institutions. The process of locating the missing is achieved through the work of two main sections: outreach and data management. Outreach is the principal division of the office and encompasses all community investigation, exhumations, and activities relating to the families: the handover of mortal remains, updating families about their cases, and clothing exhibits. The data management section maintains a consolidated list of missing persons, developed in conjunction with the ICRC, and organises all other relevant data, such as ante-mortem information, possible location of burials, the status of the case, and information on events of disappearance. The success of OMPF in speeding the resolution of the missing persons issue in Kosovo has been based on four key strategies: central coordination, information management and sharing, local capacity building, and open communication with families of victims.

OMPF was created as a coordinating body, to centralise all the information pertaining to persons missing after the Kosovo conflict. This is imperative, given the fact that the

missing persons issue includes a number of interrelated factors and cannot be reduced to a few variables. Tactical operations such as exhumations and post-mortem examinations can only proceed after attempting to define the 'universe of the missing'. Gathering information about who is missing and how they disappeared is an essential first step, and this information must be consolidated within one organisation. In order to ensure the compatibility and integrity of the information, SOPs should be enforced and should only be modified by persons at a coordinating level. Since this process can take considerable time, the coordinating body should make every effort to protect gravesites from unauthorised tampering.

Both before and during the search for the missing, the management of information is central to the process of clarifying their fate. OMPF maintains a number of coordinated, searchable databases and is currently developing a platform to consolidate all its information under a single system. There is a delicate balance to be reached between data protection and information sharing, and files must be collected and stored according to laws governing the use of personal data.¹⁸ Though information pertaining to the investigation and prosecution of crime must sometimes be restricted, information regarding missing persons and human remains should be shared with few constraints. By beginning with a coordinated information-sharing strategy and recording data in a purpose-built platform, a considerable momentum can be generated for resolving the problem.

Since the issue of the missing is rarely fully resolvable, it is imperative to build the capacity of national staff to carry on working after the international presence subsides. Following the approach of teams investigating human rights violations in Latin America and elsewhere,¹⁹ OMPF has tried to mobilise local forensic resources while imposing external standards. Local staff are constantly trained in order to develop the local infrastructure for dealing with the humanitarian consequences of past and future human rights violations. This serves the goal of sustainable forensic investigation, as well as empowering local populations to participate in post-conflict processes that tend to be determined by an external authority.

Lastly, OMPF has seen that any attempt to address missing persons issues requires a clear campaign of communication. Not only does this fulfil the right of the families to be informed, it serves to prevent them from attempting to exhume the remains of their loved ones. As was seen with the Rwanda example above, doing so jeopardises both the identification and investigation processes by destroying evidence and commingling the remains found in mass graves. The communication strategy should send a clear message that locating missing persons is a priority and is being pursued expeditiously by a central organisation. Families should be invited to play an active role in the search for the missing, and reassured that gathering ante-mortem data and other information is an essential part of the process.

The Identification Process

The process of identification used by OMPF combines the complementary processes of DNA testing and what is now referred to as 'traditional identification methods', involving the comparison of 'ante-mortem' and 'post-mortem' data. Ante-mortem information is a physical description of a missing person while alive, including age, sex, height, dental work, healed bone fractures, and degenerative physical conditions. Post-mortem information is determined by physical anthropologists and pathologists working on a set of

human remains. Their observations help not only determine the cause of death, but also sex, the age of that person at death, and other identifying characteristics. A strong correspondence between ante-mortem and post-mortem profiles indicates a high probability that the human remains are those of the missing person.

Once this 'presumptive identification' has been established, in most cases, DNA testing is used to confirm the findings of the anthropologist. Bone taken from an unidentified body is compared with blood from living persons to determine their kinship. In the case of a 'presumptive' identification, OMPF has already established the probable identity of that person and their DNA is compared with their supposed relative. In most cases, however, positive results are derived from 'random matches' in which DNA from a bone sample corresponds with a DNA profile stored in a computer library. Considering the number of victims in Iraq, it is clear that the identification process will need to employ a broad range of strategies, resulting in both individual and group identifications where appropriate. Protocols should be enforced that include both 'traditional' anthropological methods and DNA testing where needed. Insisting on an unnecessarily detailed level of forensic investigation can cause a drain on resources and slow the process when dealing with a large number of missing persons.

The comparison of ante-mortem and post-mortem information is a simple concept complicated by a vast number of irregularities. Due to the clandestine nature of forced disappearances, rarely will 'the universe of the missing' constitute a complete picture. Certain particularities must be addressed during processes of investigation and ante-mortem information gathering in order to ensure that key data are not overlooked. Furthermore, targeted strategies may be employed to increase the efficiency of identifications, such as the clothing show discussed below.

The investigation as to the fate of a missing person must form part of a broader strategy of information gathering, and include specialists with appropriate experience. Whereas a mass disaster constitutes a discrete and finite event, historical human rights violations can be regarded as an open system. In the latter, many happenings occur over a period of time, over a wide area, and the precise number of victims is generally not known. In addition, human rights violations are more often investigated after human remains have decomposed or skeletonised, requiring forensic anthropologists and archaeologists to attempt to identify them. Understanding how people went missing can help to establish their whereabouts, and determine the composition of the target group. Thus, 'events of disappearance' must be reconstructed as far as possible: who was taken and by whom, how many were taken, in what manner, at what time, where they were meant to be going, etc. Enforced disappearance is a well-planned practice designed to provoke anguish in the population as well as a sense of helplessness and relentlessness. A sense of the patterns and motivations of such practices is valuable for the identification process, and not merely for prosecutorial purposes.

As investigations continue concerning the pattern of forced disappearances, systematic information must be collected about each individual. The coordinating body should determine whether ante-mortem data exists for a given missing person. If not, it should be collected by interviewing relatives or witnesses. This information, including biological profile and clothing at the time of disappearance, can be from people other than family who were close to the victim, and can be a combination of data from different people. This collection of ante-mortem data must be adapted to the context in which the investigation takes place, but a useful framework is provided by the ICRC in *The Missing: The Right to Know*.²⁰ The forms for the collection of these data should not simply mimic forms

used for mass disasters as the circumstances will differ considerably. The best known example is the Disaster Victim Identification system in which the underlying assumption is that the remains of the victims are fresh enough to visualise scars and tattoos, and that dental and hospital records are available. Ante-mortem interviews require an empathic approach that transforms local and anecdotal knowledge into verifiable categories. For example, if the informant does not know the victim's exact age, the interviewer must associate an episode of the life of the victim (birth, puberty, etc.) to a specific event that could be accurately dated (a war, a natural disaster, etc.).

Post-mortem data must also be determined with reference to the region in which investigations are taking place. Osteological age indicators are population-specific, meaning that the relationship between bone development and a person's age will vary from one region to another. In turn, the anthropologist may be restricted to establishing simple age categories such as 'young' or 'old adult' with flexible ranges. Other problems include the debatable value of stature in personal identification. Baraybar and Kimmerle²¹ argue that this is limited by differences between the stature reported by relatives, the stature reconstructed from bones, and legally recorded stature, which is impossible to verify. This means that reconstructed stature, even if using population-specific formulae, should be regarded as an element with limited weight in the identification process.²² One of the most important setbacks in third world settings (where most cases of enforced disappearances take place) is the lack of dental records. The dentist may, however, interpret the description of the teeth from an interview: a 'bump between the teeth of the upper jaw' could refer to a supernumerary tooth protruding from the palate or a major tooth rotation.

It is often useful in the pursuit of identification to show sets of clothing taken from exhumed bodies to the families of the missing. A clothing exhibition is a cathartic activity; the families feel included in the identification process and the show may even constitute almost an opportunity for early mourning. Such exhibitions depend on the systematic and thorough recovery of the clothes and personal effects of the dead. Artefacts not found in direct association with a body should not be linked to the case, as personal effects can be intermingled in mass graves.²³ Since the identification value of clothing diminishes with wear and damage, clothes should be removed carefully during the post-mortem examination, washed, and photographed.

Once the target group for the exhibition is defined, relatives are selected, prioritising next of kin. Ante-mortem information is collected from each relative prior to the exhibition, even if such information already exists. Each family is accompanied and can be given latex gloves so they may touch the clothes and artefacts. No pressure is exerted over the relatives, and they are allowed to take their time and observe the display. Once a recognition is made, the family is encouraged to see the artefacts if any. The family is not shown any specific set of artefacts or told which the ones were found with the clothing. If a family thinks they have recognised a set of clothing, they are taken to an interview area where the post-mortem and ante-mortem files can be compared. A typical interview includes a police officer specialised in identifications, one anthropologist, one dentist, and one pathologist. Each specialist asks his or her questions separately, regarding the clothing and artefacts as well as biological information about the victim.

Once the interview has finished, the experts try to come to a consensus and the pathologist has the final authority to accept a positive identification. Biological data is favoured over data from clothes and personal effects, and it is important to refer to information about the event of disappearance. For example, if the investigation suggests that a

group of missing persons was confined to one location over a period of time, they may have exchanged clothes, and biological data will be the only acceptable means of identification. In cases such as this, DNA testing is a useful tool for confirming identity. Such confirmation, however, still depends on the comparison of ante-mortem and post-mortem information to provide a presumptive identification for the DNA sample.

Conclusion

The issue of missing persons in Iraq should be coordinated by a central organisation that will consolidate all relevant information and enforce SOPs. It should have a strong humanitarian focus and address the needs of victims' families while including them in the process and sharing information. Building the capacity of Iraqis to conduct forensic work in the long term is of paramount importance.

Our experience from Kosovo tells us that focusing on the collection of forensic evidence for criminal investigations tends to preclude sustainable humanitarian solutions. Prioritising the broader social issues of psychological trauma and institution building, however, does not jeopardise the use of forensic evidence for prosecution. The needs and wishes of different groups of families must be established from the outset. The need for 'collective identification' versus 'individual identification' must be determined in consultation with community leaders.

Considering the dimension of the problem of the missing in Iraq, it may be necessary to establish multiple approaches to identify victims. These must be decided as early as possible in order not to create a dependency on unsustainable methods or those that protract the process unnecessarily. Whereas the magnitude of the missing persons issue in Iraq might suggest a 'collective identification' approach, a general social benefit can often derive from individual identifications. Often a single, definitive identification of a person can trigger an emotional release and acceptance of loss from an entire community, allowing the healing process to begin. Such a finding can allow individuals from the community to initiate a mourning process, even if someone other than their relative has been identified. Such processes also serve to unlock a victim's language, and can motivate persons to participate in the restitution of the dead back to their communities. In this way, individual identifications can serve as group identifications, and to the emotionally invested observer may seem more immediate and concrete.

Both traditional forensic anthropology and more resource-heavy techniques such as DNA testing provide methods to associate the names of the missing with human remains. These results, however, must be understood as one small part of a greater social objective: to allow the people of Iraq to look away from their past and towards their collective future.

Notes

1. This paper expresses the views of its authors and not necessarily those of the United Nations.
2. Human Rights Watch, 'Iraq: State of the Evidence,' *Human Rights Watch*, Vol.16, No.7(E) (2004), p.22.
3. Comisión para el Esclarecimiento Histórico [CEH], *Guatemala: Memoria del Silencio: Conclusiones y Recomendaciones del Informe de la Comisión para el Esclarecimiento Histórico* (Guatemala City: CEH 1999).
4. See for example, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, *The Prosecutor v. Radislav Krstic (IT-98-33-T), Judgment* (The Hague: ICTY 2001), pp.21–5.
5. Defensoría del Pueblo and Equipo Peruano de Antropología Forense, *Manual para la investigación eficaz ante el hallazgo de fosas con restos humanos en el Peru* (Lima: Defensoría del Pueblo 2002); see also

- Jose Pablo Baraybar, 'Civil and Political Rights, Including the Questions of Torture and Detention: Human Rights and Forensic Science', *United Nations Document E/CN4/2000/57*, paras.7–11, and Jose Pablo Baraybar, 'Report on the Forensic Analysis of the Skeletal Remains Exhumed by UN OAS Civilian Mission in Haiti, October–November 1995,' report submitted to the UN OAS MICIVIH, (1995).
6. Eric Stover and Rachel Shigekane, 'The missing in the aftermath of war: When do the needs of victims' families and international war crimes tribunals clash?', *International Review of the Red Cross*, Vol. 84 (2002), pp.845–6.
 7. Human Rights Watch (note 2) p. 12.
 8. The International Committee of the Red Cross, *The Missing: The Right to Know* (Geneva: ICRC 2003).
 9. Human Rights Watch, 'The Mass Graves of Al-Mahawil: the Truth Uncovered', *Human Rights Watch*, Vol. 15, No.5(E), (2003) p. 4–5.
 10. For more information, see <http://www.phrusa.org/research/forensics>.
 11. International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, *The Prosecutor versus Clement Kayishema and Obed Ruzindana (ICTR-95-1-T), Judgment and Sentence* (Arusha: ICTR 1999) and International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, *The Prosecutor versus Georges Anderson Nderubumwe Rutaganda (ICTR-96-3), Judgment and Sentence* (Arusha: ICTR 1999).
 12. There have, however, been massive tracing efforts aimed at reunifying unaccompanied minors with their families. Many organisations contributed to this project, including ICRC, UNICEF, Save the Children, World Vision and Médecins Sans Frontières.
 13. In relation to indictments against Karadzic (IT-95-5/18), Mladic (IT-95-5/18) and Mrksic et al. (IT-95-13).
 14. For discussion of humanitarian strategies towards the missing in Bosnia, see Stover and Shigekane (note 6).
 15. Documented in internal memoranda from Jose Pablo Baraybar to ICTY Chief of Investigations John Ralston 1999.
 16. The identification work of gratis forensic teams was inexact, and some families have since reexhumed their relatives for reburial and private investigation. Because this process commingled some human remains, some identifications are presently not accepted by families.
 17. The only record of exhumations is an informal log written by the German forensic team. Other teams had no procedural obligation to report the number of bodies they exhumed, and reporting seems to have been contingent on the temperament of each team and its distance from the German sector.
 18. International Committee of the Red Cross, 'The Missing and their Families: Summary of the Conclusions arising from Events held prior to the International Conference of Governmental and Non-Governmental Experts (19–21 February 2003),' in *The Missing: The Right to Know* (Geneva: ICRC 2003), pp.50–1.
 19. Jose Pablo Baraybar et al., 'The Effective Forensic Investigation of Human Rights Violations: A Model for Training', paper presented at the American Academy of Forensic Sciences 54th Annual Meeting in Atlanta, 2002; Jose Pablo Baraybar et al., 'Peruvian Forensic Anthropology and the Memory of the Missing', paper presented at the American Academy of Forensic Sciences 55th Annual Meeting, Chicago, 2003.
 20. ICRC (note 18) pp.133–41.
 21. Jose Pablo Baraybar and Erin Kimmerle, 'Thousands Dead: The Limited Use of Stature in Individual Identification', paper presented at the American Academy of Forensic Sciences 54th Annual Meeting in Atlanta, 2002.
 22. A.H. Ross and L.W. Konigsberg, 'New formulae for estimating stature in the Balkans', *Journal of Forensic Science*, Vol.47 (2002), pp.165–7.
 23. Artefacts recovered in this context should also be shown, but displayed separately.